Abstract: Microeconomic theory predicts that if patients are fully insured and providers are paid fee-forservice, utilization of medical services exceeds the efficient level ('moral hazard effect'). In Switzerland, both demand-side cost sharing and upply-side cost sharing have been introduced to mitigate this problem. Analyzing a panel dataset of about 150,000 adults, we find both types of cost sharing to be effective in curtailing the use of medical services. However, demand-side cost sharing options are preliminarily chosen by individuals in excellent health, causing 'true' cost savings achieved by supply-side cost sharing to be more important. adults, we find both types of cost sharing to be effective in curtailing the use of medical services. However, demand-side cost sharing options are preliminarily chosen by individuals in excellent health, causing 'true' cost savings achieved by supply-side cost sharing to be more important.
(without pre-selection by employers or government agencies). 1 If, for example, a managedcare type plan is too restrictive compared to the premium rebate that is offered, it will not be chosen. Similarly, low income individuals are less likely to chose a high deductible, because transfers from health insurance to the ill are most beneficial if they are large compared to income (Nyman [1999] ).
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 contains an overview of the empirical literature. The policy setting is described in Section 3 while section 4 is devoted to a description of the data base. In Section 5, we explain the econometric methods used to separate moral hazard from self-selection effects and to deal with the very skewed distribution of HCE data. The estimation results are presented in section 6. Section 7 discusses policy implications in view of related literature, while the final section 8 contains a summary and conclusions.
Literature Review
In order to keep this review concise, we focus on empirical papers that measure moral hazard in health insurance. When individuals have a choice of plan, self-selection effects need to be accounted for because those who expect high future HCE are more likely to opt for more comprehensive insurance. A small number of researchers have avoided this selection problem by benefiting from randomized experiments (the famous RAND study; Manning et al. [1987]) or natural experiments (Chiappori et al. [1998] , Eichner [1998 ], or Winkelmann [2004 ). Other papers have used econometric techniques to address endogenous plan choice. Many econometric approaches require for identification the availability of at least one variable that influences contract choice but not utilization (an 'identifying instrument'). Pertinent studies from Switzerland are Schellhorn [2001] , Gerfin and Schellhorn [2006] and Gardiol et al. [2006] .
The former two rely on premium level and supplementary hospital insurance as identifying instruments, while the latter uses death as an indicator of morbidity which is unaffected by insurance. Using Australian data, Cameron et al. [1988] advocate income as determinant of insurance coverage but not utilization. In the US, employers play a strong role in determining the individual's choice of plan, so they can be used as identifying instruments. For example, Dowd et al. [1991] and Cardon and Hendel [2001] exploit the fact that different employers offer different premiums and co-payment levels, while Deb and Trivedi [2009] use the employer's type (public or private), the size of the firm and whether or not the employer offers both HMO and non-HMO options.
Turning to estimation techniques, one notices that instrumental variable estimators are not often applied to non-linear frameworks. An early exception are Dowd et al. [1991] who estimate a tobit model with a correction for selectivity (Lee [1978] ). However, their approach requires strict distributional assumptions such as homoscedasticity. Deb and Trivedi [2009] and Deb et al. [2006] also specify a fully parametric model of both choice and utilization equations, which is jointly estimated by maximum simulated likelihood. As health care expenditure data are extremely skewed and the distribution of the 'tail' is difficult to specify correctly, Terza et al. [2008] advocate the two-stage residual inclusion estimator. It yields consistent estimates in a wide range of non-linear least squares settings.
Studies that have addressed endogeneity in non-linear panel data models are even more rare. Non-linear fixed-effects models are plagued by the incidental parameters problem (see Lancaster [2000] for an overview, or Chamberlain [1980] for a corrective). In random effects specifications, the incidental parameters problem can be avoided by integrating out the individual specific effects (Vella and Verbeek [1998] and Vella and Verbeek [1999] ). However, this again requires a parametric specification of their distribution.
An alternate approach of exploiting the information of panel data was pioneered by Wolfe and Godderies [1991] . It uses HCE from prior years to proxy unobserved differences between individuals which become predetermined in the year the comparison between plans is performed (Lehmann and Zweifel [2004] , Van Kleef et al. [2008] ). In this paper, a mixture between the IV and the 'health proxy' approach will be applied.
Swiss Health Insurance
Swiss health insurance is of the 'managed competition' type (Enthoven [1978] , Van de Ven et al. [2007] ). Coverage is mandatory for a rather comprehensive 'basic' basket of medical services and pharmaceuticals, written by some 80 private, not-for-profit insurers competing in a regulated market. Free consumer choice of plan is a distinctive feature of the system. There is no pre-selection of plans by employers or government agencies and insurers must accept all applicants during annual open enrollment periods. Premium subsidies for lowincome individuals are funded out of general tax. Premiums can be differentiated by area of residence but not by health risk. Reductions are possible for young adults (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) and individuals who receive accident coverage through the employer.
In the baseline contract, insured individuals enjoy unlimited access to all licensed physicians and most hospitals in their region of residence. They face a minimum annual deductible of CHF 300 (some EUR 200 as of 2006) and a co-insurance rate of 10 percent up to a cap of CHF 700 (EUR 470) per year. Physicians in independent practice are reimbursed feefor-service according to an administered fee schedule that is collectively bargained between the providers' and the insurers' associations. Hospitals receive per diems for patients treated (the introduction of a DRG system is under way). The cantons 2 finance hospital investment and one-half of operational cost. While this system is generally found to ensure access to comprehensive health care to all citizens, it is criticized for high and rapidly increasing HCE, lack of co-ordination between providers, and lack of information about quality and efficiency (OECD [2006] ).
In response to these problems, insurers have been granted the right to offer managed-care type options (since 1994) and higher deductibles (since 1996) in return for lower premiums.
However, policy makers feared that these options would attract low risks. In addition to a risk adjustment scheme based on age and sex, they imposed limits on possible premium reductions. For voluntary deductibles, these are fixed percentages of the base premium or 80 percent of the additional risk (deductible minus 300), whichever is less. The eligible deductible levels are also regulated, as shown in Table 1 . In managed-care type contracts, the insurer must prove that the reduction is justified by efficiency gains rather than self-selection effects.
Furthermore, it must not exceed 20 percent during the first five years since the launch of the contract. The same deductible levels apply to managed care-type and FFS plans. 
Data
The data base consists of individual records of more than 160,000 Swiss adults insured by CSS, a major Swiss insurer, and covering the years 2003 -2006 . It includes age, gender, residential location, contract choice, and HCE. Individuals who were not observed over the entire four years are excluded from the analysis, with death constituting the main cause.
While the deathbound are known to cause a considerable amount of HCE, they exhibit an idiosyncratic pattern of health care utilization (see Werblow et al. [2007] ), justifying separate analysis. The influence of closeness to death also calls for exclusion of individuals who died during 2007. Buyers of the high-deductible plans are younger and more likely to be male than those with a low deductible. Their mean HCE amounts to CHF 1,057 or 23 percent of that pertaining to individuals with the minimum deductible. The fraction of those reporting positive HCE is 57 rather than 88 percent. If only those with positive HCE are taken into account, the mean is CHF 1,804 or 34 percent of the low-deductible benchmark, respectively. These differences point to sizeable effects of demand-side cost sharing (which still need to be corrected for self-selection effects, see below). (Lamers and Van Vliet [2003] ). While the insurer does not impose guidelines or utilization reviews, many networks run them internally, combined with quality monitoring by independent auditors in some cases.
In order to get a preliminary indication of the extent to which the cost differences may be caused by self-selection effects, it is instructive to compare the HCE of consumers who switch to higher deductibles and IPA plans with that of those who do not (see Table 3 ).
The 
Developing a Proxy for Unobserved Health Status
The dataset does not contain direct information on health status such as diagnostic codes, restrictions on activities of daily living, or self-reported health. However, panel data allows to develop an indicator of health status from prior HCE (see Van Kleef et al. [2008] , Lehmann and Zweifel [2004] , Wolfe and Godderies [1991] ). In particular, Lehmann and Zweifel show that residuals from a random-effects Tobit regression of prior HCE on exogenous variables can serve as a proxy for unobserved health.
However, in view of considerable heteroscedasticity in the dataset, the two-part model is preferable over the Tobit. The first part is a random-effects probit model predicting the probability of observing positive HCE for individual i in year t [see Eq. (1)]. The second part estimates the amount of HCE given that it is positive. The log transformation serves to reduce the skewness of the dependent variable. Equation (2) can also be justified by noting that an individual's health is to be seen relative to her age, gender, and regional peers. The present panel is unbalanced, as many individuals had positive HCE in some but not in all years. A Wooldridge test of serial correlation in the error term (Wooldridge [2002] ) rejected the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. Therefore, the feasible generalized least squares procedure proposed for unbalanced panels by Baltagi and Wu [1999] is applied to gain efficiency while avoiding biased estimation of standard errors. The model applied for deriving the health status proxy thus reads (all error terms assumed normally distributed),
with
Eqs (1) and (2) 
Endogeneity of Contract Choice
Even if the proxy can sufficiently control for unobserved differences in current health status, there are additional unmeasured variables that may cause someone opting for the minimum deductible to have a great deal of HCE, resulting in an overestimation of moral hazard effects.
Examples are private information about probabilities of future illness, general attitude towards medical care, and previous experience with the health care system. Ignoring these confounders will lead to omitted variable bias in the HCE equation. Terza et al. [2008] show that the residuals from an equation modeling contract choice are good estimators of these confounders.
Therefore, including these residuals into the HCE equation alongside observed contract choice and the proxy for latent health serves to control for unobserved confounders (two stage residual inclusion estimation, 2SRI). The 2SRI method yields also consistent estimates if the HCE equation is nonlinear. However, it requires equations for contract choice to be specified. 2. Absolute premium reductions for a higher-deductible or an IPA option: While higher rebates make these contract options more attractive, they do not influence health care consumption for the reasons described in 1.
3. Number of years of CSS membership: 7 Long-standing members are known not to switch contracts, making them less likely to opt for a higher-deductible or an IPA option. However, loyalty is correlated with health status because consumers who develop chronic conditions face a premium hike if they sign up with another insurer for the supplementary component (which they usually prefer to have from the same insurer to avoid ambiguity as to responsibility for payment). Nevertheless, preliminary estimations showed it to be insignificant in the HCE equation when entered in combination with the health status proxy. It therefore qualifies as identifying restriction.
4. Dummy indicating a bad credit record: This may reflect lower income, which is relevant for contract choice. At the same time, a bad credit record proved unrelated to HCE, once the proxy for health status was included.
5. IPA officially on offer within the individual's zipcode area: This proved to be unrelated to utilization if regional differences were controlled for by dummies. However, the availability of an IPA importantly favors the choice of the corresponding option.
Modeling the choice of deductible calls for an ordered probit model, while for the choice of the IPA a probit model is sufficient. Starting with the latter for simplicity, the generalized residuals are given by Gourieroux et al. [1987] . Let h i be an indicator variable equal to one if the IPA plan was chosen and zero otherwise, z i a vector of covariates, andθ a vector of the estimated coefficients. Then the generalized residuals are given bŷ
where Φ denotes the cumulative and ϕ, the standard normal density respectively. In the same spirit, the generalized residuals for multinomial or ordered choice models have been defined by Vella [1993] . Let there be i= 1. 
withΠ ik denoting the estimated probability that individual i chooses the k-th alternative andπ ik , the estimated value of the density at that point. These two quantities are determined as follows. Letγ be the vector of estimated coefficients from the ordered probit andα k , the estimated cut points with α 0 = −∞, and α K = ∞. Then,
Specification of the Outcome Equations
The distribution of HCE has a cumulation point at zero. Among the alternatives available for dealing with this fact, the two-part model is preferred over e.g. the Tobit model for two reasons. First, the zeros are perceived as reflecting choices rather than missing values (see Jones [2000] ). Second, both supply-and demand-side cost sharing are known to affect the decision to use health care in a different manner than they affect the decision how much care to use.
The first part of the two-part model is often specified by probit and estimated by maximum likelihood. However, with the inclusion of the residuals of the contract choice variables, the errors are non-normally distributed and maximum likelihood is not consistent. Instead, a glm estimation with a probit link is applied. This method is consistent as long as E(d|x) = Φ(xβ), with d denoting an indicator that equals one if HCE > 0 and zero otherwise. Normal distribution of the error terms is not required (Cameron and Trivedi [2005] ). 8
The specification of the second part (HCE|HCE > 0) has been discussed by Manning function. As MM point out, the GLM estimates are consistent as long as the mean function is correctly specified, but might lead to imprecise estimates if the residuals are positively skewed even after transformation to log. Following the procedure for model selection suggested by MM, we start with a consistent GLM procedure, the gamma regression. The kurtosis of the residuals on the log scale is 3.53. This creates a tradeoff between imprecision (GLM) and possible bias (OLS applied to ln(y)). In this work, GLM is used because taking heteroscedasticity into account is deemed more important than precision. Given GLM, a Park test is performed to select the variance function. The estimated λ is 1.81, which is closest to the gamma specification.
The residuals from the contract choice equation are estimates rather than observations.
Not accounting for this in the outcome estimation could lead to downward biased estimates of the standard errors (Heckman [1976] ). Therefore, the standard errors were obtained by bootstrapping. 9
Results

Effects of Demand-Side and Supply-Side Cost Sharing
The results for the first part of the two-part model are shown in the first three columns of Regardless of the specification, voluntary deductibles progressively reduce the probability of positive HCE; however, their effect is about seven times smaller in the full and restricted than in the naive specification, pointing to considerable self-selection effects based on health status. On the other hand, they cannot be said to depend on the type of plan (DED * IPA insignificant). By way of contrast, membership in an IPA is associated with a higher probability of positive HCE (significant only in the restricted model). This may be the effect of preventive services offered. For example, one large IPA hands out vouchers for free immunizations against the flu in the fall. The variable 'drugs via pharmacy' measures the percentage of drug expenditure sold by pharmacies as opposed to physicians in the individual's 9 The estimation was repeated 400 times after resampling with replacement (clustered by patient). In our specific application, the bootstrapped standard errors turned out to be similar to those obtained in the original estimation.
10 To be specific, let βa and β b be the coefficients of two dummies, β ab the coefficient of their interaction and x ′ β the influence of all other variables at representative values. The marginal effect of the interaction term is Φ(βa + β b + β ab +x′β) − Φ(βa +x′β) − Φ(β b +x′β) + Φ(x′β). For a dummy without interaction, the marginal effect is Φ(βa +x′β) − Φ(x′β). As these marginal effects are combinations of all coefficients, their standard errors are calculated by the delta method. The calculations are run in STATA using the nlcom command. area of residence. Some cantons allow physicians to dispense pharmaceuticals on their own account, creating an incentive to over-prescribe. However, this fact does not seem to have an impact on HCE. 11 Finally, it is noteworthy that the squared and the cubic form of the health proxy are highly significant as well. The impact of past, time-invariant health status on current expenditure does not appear to be linear over the whole distribution of HCE.
In the second part of the model, the amount of HCE is estimated (last three columns of Table 4 ). Higher voluntary deductibles are again found to progressively reduce HCE regardless of specification. This time, the full and restricted models point to effects that are four times smaller than according to the naive model. Type of contract does not play a role (DED * IPA insignificant). Turning to the IPA alternative, one notices a reduction of HCE amounting from 12 (full model) to 19 percent (restricted model), less than one-half of the estimate suggested by the naive specification.
Estimating Overall Effects
In a practical context, cost savings in actual Francs are often of interest rather than logs or probabilities. Unlike relative savings, these depend on the expenditure level of the subpopulation in question. 12 The results are displayed in Table 5 . For estimate (1), expected HCE according to type of contract is estimated by predicting the product of the probability of positive HCE and the amount of HCE. For instance, individuals with the baseline contract had expected HCE of CHF 4,320 (the reference value), while those with a high deductible combined with the IPA option had CHF 843 only. Note that the value of CHF 843 is the estimated average expenditure of the individuals who actually chose the high deductible and IPA contract. In order to estimate the expenditure of the same subpopulation assuming they had chosen the baseline contract, the dummies for deductibles and IPA plans are set to zero when predicting expected HCE. The results are shown as estimate (2) of Table 5 . For example, estimate (2) for the subpopulation in the high-deductible combined with the IPA option amounts to CHF 1,111. As estimates (2) assume everybody to have chosen the baseline contract, differences from the reference value amount to pure risk-selection effects. For 11 The existing literature on the issue is inconclusive. For example, Vatter and Ruefli [2003] and Trottmann [2011] find physician dispensing to lower HCE, while Beck et al. [2004] and Zweifel [1985] find a positive effect.
12 If, for example, a group of very healthy individuals reduces their spending by 20 percent, the amount saved in absolute Francs is lower than if an average group does the same. individuals in the high-deductible-and-IPA option, these are estimated at CHF 3,209 (4,320 -1,111). Estimates (1) and (2) of the same column show predicted HCE for the same group of individuals, with (1) taking plan choice as observed and (2) assuming everyone to have chosen the baseline contract. Then, the difference between estimates (1) and (2) within one column is the estimated incentive effect; for high deductibles combined with IPA, it amounts to CHF 267 (=1,111 -843). Note that while this number seems rather low, it amounts to 24 percent of the predicted cost for this subpopulation assuming they were in the baseline contract. As these individuals are healthy on average, their potential for cost savings in absolute Francs is lower than that of sicker individuals. For individuals in the high deductible and FFS option, the estimated moral hazard reduction amounts to CHF 322 (=1,422 -1,100). Finally, the IPA option combined with the minimum deductible profits from moderate risk selection and achieves an absolute moral hazard reduction of CHF 355.
Specification Tests
In order to test the validity of our results, several alternate specifications were applied. In the first and the third column of Table 6 Finally, a fixed effects specification was used on the second part of the two-part model. 13 The target variable here is the log of cost over the years 2004 -2006 . For the high deductible and the IPA, the estimated incentive effects are close to those in Table 4 . For the medium deductible, the direct incentive effect is weaker and insignificant, but the interaction term with the IPA is stronger. Table 4 . The health proxy was calculated yearly.
Standard errors in parentheses, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
The switchers allow for an alternate testing strategy. Here, the target variable is the difference in cost from one year to the next. This difference is symmetrically distributed, so the estimations were run by an untransformed linear random effects model. As the estimated incentive effects in Table 5 are calculated relative to the baseline contract, they are comparable to the effect of a switch away from the baseline. Column 1 of Table 7 shows the number of observations for each type of switch, column 2 shows the estimated coefficients. In the medium and high deductible case, the estimates are in the range of those in Table 5 . For the IPA options,the estimated effects in the switcher regression are smaller than those in Table 5 . The standard errors in the switcher estimation are larger, likely because of the limited number of 13 It was not applied to the first part because of the incidental parameters problem (see Section 2).
switchers observed. Additional regressors are equal to those in Table 4 . Standard errors in parentheses, *p<0.05, **p<0.01,***p<0.001.
Which Types of Medical Care Are Most Affected by Cost Sharing?
In order to analyze the effects of cost sharing in more detail, the estimation technique described in section 5 is applied to general practitioners' services, specialists, drugs, physical therapy, outpatient hospital services and inpatient hospital services. Note that all services rendered by qualified specialists are attributed to 'specialist medicine' although qualified specialists might also provide primary care services. In line with the four part model advocated by Duan et al. [1982] , the probability of observing positive hospital expenditure is estimated only for the individuals with positive outpatient expenditure.
A medium deductible significantly reduces the probability of GPs, drugs and hospital outpatient services. For specialized medicine, a significantly positive influence is estimated, which contradicts intuition. A high deductible reduces the probability of all types of care. The impact on hospital inpatient care is surprising as most patients have used up the deductible before entering a hospital. However, patients with high deductibles are less likely to enter the whole process of diagnostic testing and procedures, which also reduces the probability of being hospitalized. The IPA-option is found to encourage the use of GP, specialists and drugs but discourages the use of physical therapy and hospital services.
Turning to the second part of the two-part model, a medium deductible has a negative impact on the utilization of GP services and drugs. A high deductible reduces the amount of GP care, specialist medicine and drugs. Finally, the IPA option reduces the expenditure for almost all types, most strongly for specialists and drugs. As fees of specialists and hospitals Table 4 Standard errors in parentheses, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 are regulated to be equal in the FFS and the IPA sector, the expenditure effect is due to a reduction in quantity only. 14
Discussion
The aim of this section is to discuss the policy implications of our results, relating them to recent literature. A first surprising result is that the estimated absolute cost reduction due to a deductible of CHF 500 rather than 300 (CHF 250, see Table 5 again) exceeds the maximum increase in out-of-pocket expenditure (CHF 200 = 500 -300). This is confirmed by two other recent studies using Swiss data from earlier years when the minimum deductible was CHF 230 and the next lowest CHF 400 (see Table 9 ).
14 In order to validate our results, we reestimated the second part of the model by ols on log expenditure. The estimates are close and equal in sign. The only exception it the coefficient for hospital outpatient services, which is significantly negative in the OLS estimation. It is not a priori clear which is more plausible for this heterogenous patient group. Some patients are chronically ill and in need of repeated procedures (suggesting no effect), while others visit the emergency room for relatively minor ailments (where deductibles might well be effective). Van Kleef et al. [2008] estimate that raising the deductible from CHF 230 to 400 would serve to reduce expenditure by CHF 382, exceeding the maximum increase in out-of-pocket expenditure by CHF 212. Gardiol et al. [2005] take the maximum deductible of CHF 1,500 as the point of reference and calculate the incentive effects from there. The transition from the medium deductible of CHF 400 to the minimum of CHF 230 is estimated to generate 'true' savings of CHF 185 (=697-512), which again exceeds the out-of-pocket difference of CHF 170.
The second point relates to risk adjustment (RA). Note from Table 6 that estimated moral hazard reductions not only fall far short of gross differences in expected HCE as indicated by estimates (1) but are markedly plan specific. Van Kleef et al. [2008] and Van Kleef et al.
[2006] discuss the challenges this varying mix of risk-selection and moral hazard effects poses to regulators in a system which community rating and RA. The issue is the extent to which insurers should be allowed to pass on gross savings to consumers. The appropriate amount seems to be the amount of 'true' savings net of risk-selection effects. Yet, Van Kleef et al. [2006] show that if only very low risks opt for higher deductibles at first, premium reductions reflecting 'true' savings are too small to create incentives for these options. 15 As a remedy, it is beneficial not to entirely net out risk-selection effects for determining allowable premium reductions. Empirical evidence by Van Kleef et al. [2008] shows that the current RA schemes of the Netherlands and Switzerland do leave room for risk-selection effects in the premium reductions.
Conclusions
Managed competition in social health insurance aims at creating incentives for insurers to increase efficiency and respond to consumer preferences while preserving solidarity between high-and low-risk types (Van de Ven et al. [2007] ). Therefore, it is important to know whether contractual innovations such as deductibles or capitated IPA plans achieve true cost savings rather than merely serving as a means for risk selection. This research measures and compares the impacts of demand-side cost sharing (through voluntary deductibles) and supply-side cost sharing (through prepaid IPA plans) on total health care expenditure ( Higher annual deductibles and IPA plans are both found to achieve marked reductions of moral hazard. An increase in the deductible by CHF 200 (some EUR 133) decreases the estimated probability of positive HCE during a given year by almost 1 percentage point, while the IPA plan is associated with an increase of about 1.1 points. The amount of positive HCE is reduced by some 7 percent and 12 percent, respectively. Increasing the deductible by CHF 700 (some EUR 466) reduces the probability of reporting HCE by about 3.7 percent and the amount of positive HCE by about 18 percent.
Still, this research is subject to several limitations. First, since the data set only comprises individuals who were with one and the same insurer from 2003 -2006 , it fails to measure riskselection effects associated with changes between competing insurers. Second, even 'within' risk-selection effects may not be controlled for perfectly. There is no guarantee that the HCE equation is correctly specified for the three preceding years, yielding residuals that serve as good proxies for unobserved health. The same caveat applies to the residuals of the contract choice equations. Thus, estimates of expected HCE reductions achieved by higher deductibles and IPA plans could still be biased. Third, the effects of the deductible option contain price and income effects. As shown by Nyman [1999] only the former should be counted as inefficient consumption. Finally, results relating to IPA plans have limited generality as long as they cannot be related in detail to the incentives faced by participating health care providers.
Nevertheless, the findings permit to draw the conclusion that allowing insurers to offer plans with both demand-side and supply-side cost sharing reduced spending in Swiss social health insurance. After controlling for risk-selection effects, both variants are estimated to achieve marked reductions in moral hazard that can be passed on to consumers in the guise of premium reductions without jeopardizing insurers' solvency. 
Appendices
A Estimating a Proxy for Health Status
